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1. Introduction 
On November 1, 2009 Reuters magazine reported that CIT Group Inc. filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy. CIT Group was a storied lender to individual and businesses but because of the 
global financial crisis it was unable to sustain itself. As people began to default on their loans 
through the crisis, the $2.3 billion CIT Group had received through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Plan proved incapable of keeping them afloat. If CIT Group could not emerge from bankruptcy it 
would further damage the shrinking available credit market for small businesses. Armed with a 
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy plan, CIT Group entered bankruptcy aiming to reduce 
its total debt by $10 billion. They planned to achieve this by transferring ownership to their 
creditors and reducing the face value of bond issued debt by 30%. Just 38 days after filing, CIT 
Group successfully emerged from bankruptcy by eliminating $10.5 billion worth of debt. 
The case of CIT Group raises some interesting questions about the emergence of a 
financial firm from bankruptcy. What was it about CIT Group that made it able to emerge from 
Chapter 11 when so many other financial institutions have failed to do so? What was it that made 
CIT Group able to emerge in a post-financial crisis climate? In this paper, I study the 
characteristics that allow firms to emerge from bankruptcy. In addition, this study also addresses 
if certain characteristics are related to bankruptcy emergence depending on whether a firm filed 
bankruptcy before or after the financial crisis. Ultimately, using variables that have been found to 
be significant in prior research, I find that, before the financial crisis, firms who spent less time in 
bankruptcy and firms who replaced their CEO during the bankruptcy process were more likely to 
emerge from Chapter 11. I also find that no firm-specific variable that I observed was 
significantly related to bankruptcy emergence in a post-financial crisis climate. 
This paper adds to existing research in this subject area by looking at bankruptcy 
emergence through the lens of the 2008 crisis. Currently, to the best of my knowledge, the only 
research that exists, relative to changes in bankruptcy-related variables caused by a shift in the 
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greater financial climate, focuses on firm-specific variables’ relationship with the probability of 
filing bankruptcy in the future. This study differs by exploring changes that may occur in the 
relationship of firm-specific variables and bankruptcy emergence, rather than bankruptcy filing, 
relative to shifts in the financial climate. There has been research associated with bankruptcy 
emergence indicators; however, no research to the best of my knowledge that focuses on shifts in 
emergence indicators from different time periods.  
I discuss these topics by first outlining bankruptcy mechanics in the United States in 
section 2 with an emphasis on Chapter 11 filings. In section 3, I then go on to discuss the causes 
and effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Section 4 primarily summarizes prior research in the areas 
of bankruptcy, bankruptcy emergence, and the financial crisis. Using these findings, I formally 
state my hypotheses about bankruptcy emergence indicators at the end of this section. A brief 
description of the data set can be found in section 5, alongside a description of the analysis 
methodology. This is directly followed by section 6 which states the results of the statistical 
analysis procedures. I then conclude the paper in section 7 with a discussion of my findings and 
areas for future research.  
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2. Bankruptcy Mechanics 
The following information was found on the website of the United States Courts, 
www.uscourts.gov, and the United States Justice Department, www.justice.gov.  
2.1 Background 
Bankruptcy is the legal process in which a business or individual recognizes their 
inability to repay their outstanding debt. It is a mutually beneficial process for both the bankrupt 
party—the debtor—and the holders of their outstanding debt—the creditors. The process presents 
debtors with the opportunity to reset their financial situation by eliminating or restructuring their 
current debt obligations, while at the same time also providing the creditors with some form of 
repayment. Upon resolution, the debtor is forgiven certain debt obligations and is free to seek out 
credit again. 
In the United States, bankruptcy filings vary greatly between cases. The first variation 
stems from the originator of the bankruptcy petition. If the bankruptcy petition is filed with the 
United States Bankruptcy Court by the debtor, the bankruptcy is considered voluntary. Under a 
voluntary bankruptcy, a debtor willingly recognizes their inability to make payments on their 
current outstanding debt. This differs from an involuntary bankruptcy which occurs when a 
creditor, or a group of creditors, forces a debtor into bankruptcy by filing the bankruptcy petition 
against a debtor. Per 11 U.S.C. § 303, a group of three or more creditors can file a Chapter 11 or 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against a debtor if the debt owed to the creditors is unsecured and 
the sum of the debt is at least $15,775. If the debtor has less than 12 creditors, then a single 
creditor can file a bankruptcy petition against a creditor if the sum of the debt owed to the creditor 
is at least $15,775.  
The second variation in bankruptcy cases arises from which chapter the petition is filed 
under. In the United States, there are six different types of bankruptcy:  
  Chapter 7 – Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code 
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  Chapter 9 – Municipality Bankruptcy 
Chapter 11 – Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code 
Chapter 12 – Family Farmer Bankruptcy or Family Fisherman Bankruptcy 
Chapter 13 – Individual Debt Adjustment 
Chapter 15 – Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases 
The most common bankruptcy filings in the United States are Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and 
Chapter 13. For the scope of this paper, I will be focusing on Chapter 11 as this was the only type 
of bankruptcy proceeding my sample population went through. 
2.2 Chapter 11 
 A bankruptcy filed under Title 11 Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is 
more colloquially known as bankruptcy reorganization. Predominately filed by businesses, 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy offers a debtor an attempt to reorganize and restructure their debts while 
continuing their operations. While in bankruptcy, a business formulates a plan for reorganization 
which is then either accepted or rejected by their creditors and the court. 
 When a firm files for bankruptcy with their respective judicial district court, a United 
States trustee is appointed to the case to represent the United States government. This comes per 
the provision of the United States Trustee Program. The United States trustee then appoints a 
committee of unsecured creditors who can then participate in conversations pertaining to the 
administration of the bankruptcy; investigate the operations and conditions of the debtor in 
relevance to the formulation of a plan; and partake in the formulation, acceptance, and rejection 
of a plan.  
If the courts deem it necessary, a second trustee that holds no interest in the case, and 
who is elected by the committee of creditors, may also be appointed to represent the debtor in 
possession. If the bankruptcy case includes allegations of misconduct and fraud, then this second 
trustee appointment may be the appointment of an examiner who is responsible for investigating 
the debtor in possession. The trustee’s or examiner’s responsibilities include filing a schedule of 
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debts, investigating the operations of the debtor in possession, filing a plan of reorganization, 
operating a debtor’s business, and filing all necessary supplemental documentation such as tax 
returns and a disclosure statement. 
Subsequently, each party—the debtor possession, the trustee and the committee of 
creditors—can file a plan for reorganization. The debtor in possession can file a plan at the time 
of their filing or at any time during the case proceedings. This differs from the committee of 
creditors who can only file a plan for reorganization 120 days after the approval date of the 
bankruptcy petition. 
A Chapter 11 bankruptcy has several distinct characteristics. The plan must first 
designate all the classes of claims and interests. This refers to classifying creditors in to different 
groups such as secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders. The plan then must 
provide equal treatment to all creditors within the same class. This refers to a situation where the 
plan gives preferential treatment to only one secured creditor and not the others. However, the 
plan can prioritize classes; traditionally, the secured creditors are addressed first and equity 
holders are handled last. Despite the plan’s ability to prioritize creditors it cannot impair any 
creditors’ rightful claim to the debtor’s assets. Ultimately, the plan must be consistent with the 
creditors’ best interests. 
The purpose of the plan is to specifically depict the methods of implementation that the 
debtor will take to reorganize their debt. These methods cover a vast array of reorganization 
strategies. The plan must outline the transfer and retention of the debtor’s estate and securities, as 
well as the subsequent redistribution of these proceeds among the holders of claims. It must also 
give notice to any mergers or consolidations the debtor plans to pursue with any of their holdings. 
Any restructuring the debtor plans to make on an outstanding debt obligation must be outlined as 
well. Under the provisions of the plan all liens must be satisfied, medicated, or cancelled and all 
defaults must be waived or cured. 
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Along with the reorganization plan, debtors must also provide the committees and court 
with a disclosure statement. The disclosure statement aims to provide adequate information 
concerning all the debtor’s financial affairs so that the committees can make an informed decision 
about the debtor’s plan. To achieve this, the disclosure statement traditionally contains a brief 
history of the debtor along with a description and evaluation of their assets and liabilities. The 
statement must also include a comparison analysis of the outcomes of Chapter 11 reorganization 
vs. a Chapter 7 liquidation and comprehensive review of all expenses and anticipated expenses 
from the bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, some disclosure statements include a 
comprehensive risk profile of the debtor. 
For the plan to be accepted, it must be approved by all classes of creditors. A class of 
creditors accepts the plan if creditors that hold at least two thirds of the amount of all outstanding 
claims, or more than half of the total number of creditors, gives approval of the plan. The courts 
must also approve the plan based on the plans anticipated feasibility, whether the plan was 
constructed in good faith, and if the plan is in compliance with all provisions.  
Once the plan is confirmed all previous debt held by the debtor is discharged. The debtor 
then takes on the revised debt obligations as outlined in the negotiated contracts under the 
approved plan of reorganization. Under the supervision of the trustee the debtor makes the 
planned payments as outlined in the reorganization until the plan has been fully executed as the 
courts have prescribed.  
 2.3 Prepackaged and Prearranged Bankruptcy 
One variant of the traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy process that is significant for the 
scope of this project, is prepackaged and prearranged bankruptcies. Under a prepackaged and 
prearranged bankruptcy, the debtor has negotiated and disclosed a reorganization plan that has 
been contractually approved by all its creditors prior to the debtor filing bankruptcy. 
The significance of this form of bankruptcy is that it drastically reduces the physical 
amount of time that a debtor is in bankruptcy proceedings. This greatly diminishes the uncertainty 
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and administrative cost that generally accompany a traditional Chapter 11 filing, subsequently 
allowing the debtor to sooner implement its reemergence strategy and continue operations as 
normal. Cleary these unique characteristics would suggest that prepackaged and prearranged 
bankruptcies would be beneficial in emerging from bankruptcy. 
3. Financial Crisis 
3.1 Background 
Starting in late 2008, and continuing through the greater portion of 2009, the largest 
financial recession since the Great Depression ravaged the United States’ financial system. 
Mortgage defaults skyrocketed to close to 3 million and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 
53.8 percent in 6 months (Saunders and Cornett 25). Many of investment banking’s largest 
players filed for bankruptcy or sought out buyers for acquisitions and mergers. The instability 
spread from the financial industry across the greater United States economy, hitting American 
automotive giants like Ford, Chrysler Group, and General Motors. The collapse of these 
institutional financial firms and industrial giants was only alleviated by massive government 
bailouts totaling over $700 billion. Despite this large stimulus package the crisis’ impact could be 
felt systemically across the United States with unemployment reaching over 10 percent. The crisis 
offers many areas for in-depth research but the scope of this section will focus on the root causes 
of the crisis, the collapse of the major financial firms, and the impacts and implications of the 
crisis on the financial system. For the purposes of this paper, I would like to see how the crisis 
impacted a firm’s probability of bankruptcy emergence, and to see if the crisis changed the 
relationship between certain firm-specific characteristics and the probability of emergence.  
3.2 Before the Collapse 
In the years preceding October 2008, the United States saw a rapid expansion in the 
economy primarily in the mortgage sector. During these years of high economic growth, low 
interest credit was widely available to end-consumers and was fully utilized. This increase in debt 
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seeking activity by end consumers created a large demand on financial institutions to supply more 
financial products. To meet this influx in demand, financial institutions then leveraged themselves 
to dangerous levels so they could expand their offerings to end-consumers. As the financial 
institutions sought out ways to exploit this market a new array of synthesized mortgage-backed 
security packages emerged (Brummer 2010).  
In short, banks could package the mortgages they made and sell their cash flows to large 
institutional investors in the form of a mortgage-backed securities. Before these securities were 
sold to investors they were rated by credit agencies—often with the highest rating possible. The 
institutional investors, who now owned hundreds of mortgages in the form of multiple mortgage-
backed securities, would in theory profit as the home owners made their regular mortgage 
payments. However, just in case homeowners stopped making payments and defaulted on their 
payments, these large institutional investors bought insurance on these mortgage-backed 
securities in the form of credit default swaps from large institutional insurers like AIG 
International. In a credit default swap, if the regular scheduled payments from the mortgage-
backed security stopped occurring because of default, a third-party insurer would pay the regular 
scheduled payment instead.  
Now this system would have worked and everyone would have profited if it were not for 
two key institutional failures. The first failure came from the mortgage issuing banks. With high 
demand for mortgages and the ability to move these mortgages off their books through 
securitization, banks were incentivized to make mortgages to subprime customers, or those with 
bad credit. This practice should not have worked in theory because investors would have been 
turned away by the inherit risk involved with these subprime securitized assets; however, a 
second institutional failure occurred. The credit rating agencies—who were being paid by the 
originating banks of the securities—often gave these subprime securities artificially high ratings. 
Under the impression that they were buying less risky securities, investors continued to purchase 
mortgage-backed securities from banks and insurers kept insuring these “safe” securities. Then 
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interest rates rose and home prices collapsed contrary to all the prevailing credit risk models that 
were being used by lending institutions. 
As home prices collapsed, subprime borrowers across the country lost their ability to 
refinance their mortgages once their adjustable interest rate rose to levels they could not afford. 
Consequently, there were widespread defaults. With an increased number of defaults, insurers 
had to contractually fulfill their credit default swaps. However, because of the mass contagion of 
defaults, insurers could not pay investors and were forced to file bankruptcy. Without the 
insurance payments, investors now had hundreds of worthless investments on their books and 
were also forced to file bankruptcy or look for an acquisition. The banks who were continuing to 
package these securities were left with no one to sell to and were now forced to keep these bad 
loans on their own books eventually leading to their own collapse. 
3.2 The Collapse of the Firms and the Market 
In an economy, it is natural for some firms to fail while others succeed, as well as for the 
more profitable firms to acquire and merge with their less successful competitors. However, in 
the case of the financial crisis, the systematic failure of a multitude of financial firms, some of 
which were the largest in the country, caused an irreversible economic downturn. 
 As people began to default on their mortgages in 2007, the financial institutions that had 
mainly comprised their portfolios with these subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities 
found themselves writing off billions in losses. Per Saunders and Cornett, “Citigroup, Merrill 
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley wrote off a combined $40 billon, due mainly to bad mortgage loans. 
Bank of America took a $3 billion write-off for bad loans in just the fourth quarter of 2007 while 
Wachovia wrote off $1.2 billion. UBS Securities took a loss of $10 billion, Morgan Stanley wrote 
off $9.4 billion, Merrill Lynch wrote down $5 billion, and Lehman Brothers took a loss of $52 
million” (25). 
 The effects were not only capped at financial losses but transcended to institutional 
failures. Countrywide Financial and IndyMac Bank, both of whom were in the top ten of the 
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United States’ largest mortgage issuers, both required bailouts from third parties. Seeing no 
improvement after utilizing the full amount of their emergency lines of credit for capital 
injections, Countrywide Financial was acquired by Bank of America to mitigate the risk of their 
failure causing a ripple effect throughout the market. Similarly, IndyMac required a $9 billion 
bailout by the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation after their depositors withdrew over $1.3 
billion. 
 The tipping point came shortly after when the Federal Reserve had to get involved in the 
fall of 2008. First, the Federal Reserve organized the merger between J.P. Morgan Chase and 
Bear Stearns, the fifth largest bank in the country. After organizing the merger, the Federal 
Reserve began lending directly to financial institutions at an average of $31.3 billion a day, 
according to Saunders and Cornett (25). The Feds involvement continued even further in 
September of 2008 when it seized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Shortly after this acquisition, 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, Merrill Lynch had to be acquired by Bank of America, and 
Washington Mutual, the largest savings institution in the country sought a buyer. These events 
caused the stock market to free fall with the Dow Jones Industrial Average falling 500 points. 
3.3 The Course of the Crisis 
With the collapse of the United States stock market, and subsequently the country’s 
largest mutual funds, credit markets froze. Not only were banks incapable of lending to 
consumers, they were also unable to lend to each other. The London Inter Bank Offering Rate 
(LIBOR), the interest rate at which banks lend to each other, skyrocketed as it was no longer 
guaranteed that the financial institution borrowing funds could be accountable to pay back their 
loans.  
To stop the free fall of the economy and unfreeze the credit markets, the United States 
government passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program in early October of 2008. The program 
allowed for the federal government to use $700 billion to stabilize the economy. About $250 
billion of the funds were used as capital injections into financial institutions to decrease the 
12 
 
amount of leverage these banks had taken. Another $40 billion went to stabilize AIG and its 
increasing insurance commitments. Citigroup, Bank of America, and a group of other financial 
institutions received bailouts of $25 billion and $20 billion respectively to take risky loans off 
their balance sheets (Saunders and Cornett 27-28). The program not only targeted financial 
institutions but it also bailed out the automotive industry with about a $25 billion injection.  
The Troubled Asset Relief Program stopped the economic free fall, but the economy 
continued to gradually decline into 2009. By January unemployment was close to 8% and the 
Gross Domestic Product had declined 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Saunders and Cornett 
29). 
As the economy began to stagnate, the government passed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. This act was a $308 billion stimulus package aimed at creating jobs through 
the expansion of infrastructure/energy related projects and the expansion of unemployment 
benefits. 
Increases in federal aid continued into February when the government passed the 
expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. The goal of this expansion was to 
stimulate demand for securities. The government hoped to achieve this through lowering the cost 
of purchasing securities to investors. With the increase in demand for securities, originating these 
packages would be cheaper for banks and the availability of end consumer credit lines, which is 
what these packages were comprised of, would increase. The expansion would also see a 
continuation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program through the creation of the Public-Private 
Investment Fund which continued to buy risky loans off banks’ balance sheets. 
3.4 Recovery and Changes 
 Towards the end of the spring in 2009 the economy showed distinct signs of making a 
recovery. According to Saunders and Cornett, “Home sales rose at an annual rate of 6.1% in 
September and were 21.2% ahead of their September 2008 numbers” (34). Accompanying the 
increase in home sales, home residential construction saw similar increases.  
13 
 
 These increases in the residential sector were only indicative of larger improvements in 
the economy. The GDP in the third and fourth quarter of 2009 rose 2.2% and 5.7% respectively 
(Saunders and Cornett 34). This GDP growth suggested a large increase in consumer spending 
and a recovery in consumer credit seeking activity. With these systemic improvements in the 
economy even the Dow Jones Industrial Average began to rebound significantly. 
With the economy in a slow recovery the government took strides to reform financial 
market to prevent against another financial crisis. In July 2010, the United States government 
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, their solution to 
systemic problems of the current financial system. One of the most significant pieces of the act 
was the extensive expansion of the Federal Reserve. The Fed could now mandate the break-up of 
any financial institution and increase their regulatory oversight to financial institutions other than 
banks. Another significant aspect of the act was the increase in capital requirements for all 
financial firms. The act also aimed at reducing market opaqueness through the regulation of 
securitization markets and credit rating agencies. It even protected end consumers through the 
increase in required transparency in consumer products such as mortgages.  
The crisis was ultimately caused by an overextension and overutilization of credit by 
banks and consumers. It showed the need for increased government regulation and oversight of 
financial institution and it also the exemplified the systemic risk that large financial institutions 
pose when they participate in depository and investing activities. The impacts of the crisis had 
very prominent effects on the activities of financial institutions. However, the impacts of the 
crisis could permeate even further, changing the ways these firms emerge from bankruptcy. 
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4. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
There is a large body of research on the characteristics and financial determinants of 
bankruptcy filings and bankruptcy emergence. There also has been extensive research into the 
effects of financial crises. This section reviews these research streams and the key findings. 
4.1 Bankruptcy Research 
In bankruptcy literature, much of the research centers around bankruptcy prediction. In 
Altman’s seminal paper from 1968, he uses discriminant analysis to present a five-factor 
prediction model, now known as Altman’s Z-score, to predict bankruptcy within two years. The 
significant indicators for bankruptcy in his model are: working capital/total assets (liquidity), 
retained earnings/total assets (profitability), earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
(operating efficiency), market value of equity/book value of total debt, and sales/total assets 
(capital-turnover). Ohlson (1986) reasserts and expands on Altman’s findings, concluding that the 
size, structure, performance, and liquidity of a firm are all statistically significant factors of the 
probability of bankruptcy. Shumway then drastically expands Altman’s and Ohlson’s findings in 
2001 by creating a hazard model for predicting bankruptcy rather using a static model. 
Shumway’s findings suggest several ignored variables are strongly correlated with bankruptcy: 
the market size of the firm, past stock performance, and the standard deviation of its stock 
returns. Another significant finding made by Richardson (1998), shows that the presence of an 
economic recession has an impact on which variables serve as predictors of bankruptcy. 
Specifically, he finds that current assets to total assets, current ratio, and leverage are significant 
predictors of failure if they are observed from periods of economic recession. This differs from 
data observed in non-recessionary periods in which income to total assets and cash to total assets 
serve as predictors alongside the aforementioned variables. 
The significance of this bankruptcy literature, in relation to this project, is that it proves 
certain firm-specific variables can be used as indicators for future bankruptcy. It also shows that 
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the macroeconomy changes the prediction power of these variables. These findings suggest that 
the macroeconomy may have a similar effect on firm-specific variables that serve as indicators 
for bankruptcy emergence. This study aims to explore this possibility further. 
4.2 Bankruptcy Emergence Research 
Prior research on bankruptcy emergence, much like the prior research on future bankruptcy, 
focuses on accounting variables that serve as predictors of bankruptcy emergence. However, the 
research on bankruptcy is controversial.  
White’s seminal theoretical model from 1984, serves as a foundation for most current 
emergence research. In his research, White finds that emergence is correlated with a firm’s free 
assets, size, earning prospects, and management commitment. Thus, larger firms with more 
uncollateralized assets, more earning potential, and more equity invested managers are more 
likely to emerge. However, subsequent research by Casey (1986) and Campbell (1996) differ 
slightly.  
Both proceeding studies reassert that free assets is a significant factor in predicting 
bankruptcy emergence but Casey’s (1986) results do not reassert that size is a significant factor. 
In terms of earnings potential, Casey (1986) finds that retained earnings, but not profitability, is 
correlated with emergence. This differs from Campbell’s (1996) findings that profitability is a 
significant emergence indicator. Lastly, neither Casey (1986) or Campbell (1996) found that the 
equity investment of managers had any correlation with emergence.  
Campbell’s research also expanded on White’s seminal work. Campbell (1996) found 
that firms with less secured creditors are more likely to emerge due to lower bankruptcy costs. In 
addition, he found that firms in the construction and manufacturing industries are significantly 
less likely to emerge. 
This existing research is important within the scope of this project because it asserts that 
there are significant changes in the emergence indicators across certain samples. The 
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controversial findings as well as the significance of the industry show that the characteristics of 
the sample plays an integral role in the probability of emergence. 
4.3 Financial Crisis Research 
Currently, to the best of my knowledge, there is no relevant research that addresses the 
2008 financial crisis’ effect on bankruptcy processes and outcomes. In a much more general 
scope, the effects of financial crises on the macroeconomy has been researched. 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) estimate that gross domestic product declines about 23 
percent on average during the first four years after a banking-related financial crisis and 33 
percent on average in advanced countries regardless of the type of financial crisis. They also have 
found even after the decline in GDP has been adjusted for net recoveries, the cost of a financial 
crisis averages about 6.8 percent of GDP. This loss in GDP combined with their finding that the 
median public debt increase 12 percent after a financial crisis makes for extremely unattractive 
market conditions. Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2009) found that available credit declines 7 
percent, housing prices drop 12 percent, and equity prices fall 15 percent after a financial crisis. 
Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li (2011) show that these conditions ultimately lead to credit-less 
recoveries in one out of every five recoveries. This phenomenon leads to a reduction in 
financially dependent activities like investing and firms dependent on external financing fail or 
grow much more slowly. 
Given the scope of the current literature, the effect of financial crises on firm specific activity, 
such as bankruptcy, has gone unexplored. The research shows that financial crises lead to credit 
crunches, which in turn would lead to less opportunities for illiquid and insolvent firms to receive 
relief from financial distress. This link between financial crises and their effect on credit can be 
extrapolated to find correlation between financial crisis events and firm bankruptcy. 
 4.4 Hypothesis 
In White’s seminal research he found that that larger firms with more profitability are 
more likely to emerge from bankruptcy than smaller, less profitable firms. Altman and Ohlson 
17 
 
also found firm structure to be associated with bankruptcy filing. Lastly, Campbell found that 
lower bankruptcy costs increase the probability of emergence. Using total assets before 
bankruptcy to model size, operating profit margin to measure profitability, solvency— the ability 
of firm to meet all its debt obligations—as a measure of overall liquidity and firm structure, as 
well as the presence of a prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy as an indicator of lower 
bankruptcy costs; I formally hypothesize that: 
1) The assets, solvency, and operating profit margin of a firm before bankruptcy 
as well as the presence of a prepackaged prenegotiated bankruptcy will be 
positively associated with bankruptcy emergence. 
 Campbell’s, Altman’s, and Ohlson’s research is also the basis for my second hypothesis. 
Altman’s and Ohlson’s findings that firm structure is significantly related to bankruptcy filings 
suggest that there may be a significant relationship between firm structure and bankruptcy 
emergence as well. Moving forward with Campbell’s finding that bankruptcy costs are negatively 
related with bankruptcy emergence, and using debt to equity as a measure of a firm’s leverage as 
well as the number of days in bankruptcy has an indicator of higher bankruptcy expenses, I 
hypothesize that: 
2) Days in bankruptcy and debt to equity will be negatively associated with 
bankruptcy emergence. 
 My third and my final hypothesis is largely based off the research of Richardson as well 
as Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li. Richardson (1998) found that in times of economic recession firm 
structure is more significant of a factor in the probability of bankruptcy as compared to non-
recessionary periods. Accompanied by Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li’s finding that one in five 
recoveries are credit-less; this information leads me to hypothesize that: 
3) The assets, solvency, and profit margin will be more significantly positively 
associated with bankruptcy post crisis as well as debt to equity being more 
significantly negatively related to bankruptcy emergence post crisis. 
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5. Data and Methodology 
For this study, I will be looking at publicly traded financial firms that went bankrupt from 
1983 to 2013. The data has been collected from the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research 
Database and has been pared down to a collection of ten variables that are hypothesized to be 
significant in realm of bankruptcy emergence. The variables consist of four financial variables 
and six non-financial variables. The variables will be tested using a difference-in-means t-test and 
a binary logistic regression. 
 5.1 UCLA LoPucki Database 
The UCLA LoPucki Bankrutpcy Research Database is a vast collection of bankruptcy 
data. It is comprised of over 200 different variables on about 1000 different bankrupt firms 
spanning 37 years.  
For a firm to be included in the database it needs to be a large publicly traded company. 
For the scope of this database large public firms are defined as firms who have “filed an Annual 
Report (form 10-k) with the Securities and Exchange Commission for a year ending not less than 
three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case” and “if that Annual Report reported assets 
worth $100 million or more, measure in 1980 dollar (about $287 million in current dollars)” 
(Lopucki 3). The database includes data stretching back to October 1, 1979 and is updated 
monthly with new additions. It only covers bankruptcy cases that are filed under Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 11 regardless of the filer. 
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5.2 Data Organization and Variable Selection 
 *Table 1 – Summary Table of Variable 
 
Starting with the original data set that I acquired in October of 2016, there was 218 
variables for 122 financial companies that went bankrupt between 1983 and 2013. Based on prior 
research, I parsed the data for eight specific variables: whether the firm emerged, solvency before 
bankruptcy, assets before bankruptcy, operating profit margin before bankruptcy, days in 
bankruptcy, whether it was a prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy, the debt to equity ratio 
before bankruptcy, and year filed.  
Despite not being potential indicator variables the “Emerged” and “Year Filed” variables 
were kept as dummy variables for the eventual t- test and binary logit regression. The “Year 
Filed” variable was used to create a dummy variable that represented a pre-financial crisis 
bankruptcy versus a post financial crisis bankruptcy. Firms who filed bankruptcy prior to 2008 
Variables Type of Variable Measurement of the Variables Summary
Emerged Binary 1 for emerged
0 for failure
Whether the firm emerged from bankrutpcy
Assets Before Continous In millions of U.S. Dollars The amount of assets held by a firm before 
bankruptcy
Operating Profit Margin Before Continous Expressed as a ratio Operating profit margin before bankruptcy
Days In BK Discrete Calendar Days The number days the firm was in bankruptcy
Solvency Before Binary 1 for solvent
0 for insolvent
Measurement of a firm's liquidity before 
bankruptcy
Involuntary BK Binary 1 for involuntary
0 for voluntary
Whether the firm was forced in to bankruptcy by 
their creditors
CEO Days Before Discrete Calendary Days The tenure of the CEO prior to bankruptcy 
PrepackPreNeg Binary 1 for prepackaged/prenegotiated bankruptcy
0 for not 
Whether the bankruptcy was prepackaged or 
prenegotiated 
Ceo Gender Binary 1 for Male
0 for female
The gender of the CEO during bankruptcy
Ceo Replaced During BK Binary 1 for Replaced
0 for Not Replaced
Whether the CEO was replaced in during the 
bankruptcy
DE_Ratio Continous Expressed as a ratio Debt to Equity ratio before bankruptcy
YearFiled Discrete Calendar Year Year the firm filed for bankruptcy
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were assigned a 0 value to represent pre-financial crisis bankruptcy and firms who filed 
bankruptcy in 2008 or thereafter were assigned a value of 1 to represent a post-financial crisis 
bankruptcy. This dummy variable was used to separate my data into two populations to run a 
difference-in-means t-test. The “emerged” dummy variable (bankruptcy emergence=1 and failure 
to emerge from bankruptcy=0) was used in the binary logit regression to model bankruptcy 
emergence. 
“Solvency Before”, measured as 0 or 1, represents a firm’s ability to meet their long-term 
debt obligations before bankruptcy. Simply, this represents whether a firm’s assets total more 
than the sum of all its debt. If the company was solvent at the time of their bankruptcy filing 
“Solvency Before” would equal 1. If a company was insolvent, “Solvency Before” would equal 0. 
This variable represents an indirect measure of liquidity which prior research suggests is 
associated with bankruptcy. 
“Assets Before”, is the asset value that a firm held on its balance sheet prior to filing 
bankruptcy, thus this variable can be used a measurement of a firm’s size. In prior research it was 
found that the size of a firm is positively associated with bankruptcy emergence. 
Like “Assets Before”, “Operating Profit Margin Before”, which was calculated by 
dividing the firm’s operating income by their net sales, serves as a measurement for a firm’s 
profitability. This characteristic has been found to be positively associated with bankruptcy 
emergence. 
Using Campbell’s (1996) findings that variables which are associated with higher 
bankruptcy costs are directly associated with bankruptcy emergency, I use “Days In Bankruptcy” 
to model this as the variable serves as an indirect measurement of bankruptcy costs. 
The variable “Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Bankruptcy” is also included because of its 
association with bankruptcy costs. Prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies tend to acquire 
less administrative cost and thus should be associated with a greater chance of bankruptcy 
emergence. 
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“Debt to Equity” is used as a measurement of a firm’s leverage. Prior research suggests 
that firms that are leveraged with more debt tend to be less likely to emerge from bankruptcy. 
Along with these variables, I also tested variables that have not been tested in this 
literature stream: CEO gender and whether the CEO was replaced during bankruptcy.  
Currently CEO related variables are a popular topic in financial research. I decided to test 
CEO gender because Khan and Vieto (2013) found that CEO gender is associated with firm 
performance. They found that firms with female CEOs have smaller risk levels than firms with 
male CEOs. Due to the relationship between risk level and gender there may be by extension a 
relationship between gender and bankruptcy emergence. 
Whether the CEO was replaced during the bankruptcy process may also hold interesting 
results as well. Replacing a CEO can be indicative of a firm’s board bringing in a CEO who 
specializes in managing failing firms which would suggest that it would be associated with 
bankruptcy emergence. It also can be indicative of the gross mismanagement of a firm prior to 
bankruptcy which would suggest it is associated with failure. 
The last variable that I chose to test was whether the bankruptcy proceedings were 
involuntary. If a firm was a forced into bankruptcy by its creditors this may suggest that there is a 
significant level of unpreparedness and thus involuntary bankruptcies may be strongly associated 
with bankruptcy emergence. 
Using a combination of these variables, I hope to model the probability of bankruptcy 
emergence. 
 5.3 Univariate Analysis 
The first statistical analysis I will perform on these variables will be an independent-
sample difference-in-means t-test. An independent-samples t-test is a form of hypothesis testing 
that determines the probability of a statistically significant difference in the means of two 
different samples. For the scope of this project the two samples will be Pre-Crisis Bankruptcies 
and Post-Crisis Bankruptcies. Since I am trying to show that there is a differences in the means of 
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these samples, the null hypothesis which I will be trying to reject is that the means of the 
populations are not statistically different. Ultimately, this test shows whether the difference in the 
two groups’ means reflects a “real” difference rather than because the samples were irregular. 
To see if two means are statistically different one must first calculate a t-statistic. A t-
statistic is simply the difference in the two samples’ means over the variability of the two 
samples, also called the standard error of the difference. To calculate the variability, you must 
first calculate the variance for each sample then divide it by the number of observations you have 
in each sample. Then add these values together and take the square root. The subsequent t-value 
represents the difference of the estimated value from its actual observed value. This entire 
equation can be expressed as follows: 
 
  𝑡 =
?̅?1−?̅?2
√
𝜕1
𝑛1
+
𝜕2
𝑛2
 
 
Using this t-statistic, one can calculate the significance of this result from a normal t 
distribution table using the samples degrees of freedom by calculating the p value. If the p value 
is under .05 then one can reject null hypothesis; however, if the p value is over .05 then there is 
not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In terms of this project, if a variable has a p-
value lower than .05 then there is a statistically significant difference in the means of this variable 
Pre-Crisis compared to Post-Crisis. 
5.4 Multivariate Logistic Regression 
The second analysis procedure I will be running on my data is a logistic regression using 
emergence as a binary response. For the scope of this project, a logistic regression model 
estimates the probability of the emergence (1) or failure of a firm (0) based on one or more 
indicator variables. Using the maximum likelihood estimates, a binary logistic regression model 
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forms a function that maximizes the probability of a certain outcome by assigning each variable a 
specific regression coefficient. Each of these coefficients measures a variables’ involvement in 
variations in the dependent variable. Ultimately, a binary logistic regression can be written out 
formulaically as: 
 
 𝑝 =
𝑒𝑎+𝑏1𝑥1+𝑏2𝑥2+..
1+𝑒𝑎+𝑏1𝑥1+𝑏2𝑥2+..
 
  
In this form: 
   p = the probability of the binary response 
   e = the base of natural logarithms 
   a = the intercept of the regression equation 
   b = the coefficient associated to respective indicator variables. 
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6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Taking the full sample of 122 firms, I first ran a basic descriptive statistical analysis. In 
Table 2, I display the results. Any firm that did not have an observation for a variable was 
excluded from the means procedure which explains the varying levels of observations in the 
“N” column. From this table, I can note a few important characteristics about the data. In the 
full sample, a little less than half of the firms emerged from bankruptcy (46.28%) spending an 
average of 570.88 days in bankruptcy. Only 7.45% of firms were forced into bankruptcy by 
their creditors and 92.56% of firms had male CEOS. Of these firms 45.45% of firms replaced 
their CEOs during bankruptcy and only 18.18% of firms entered bankruptcy with 
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy plans. The tenure of a CEO before bankruptcy 
was 1337.02 days. On the financial side, the average value of total assets held by firms was 
$14.68 billion with most operating at an average loss of $195,820 a year. About 75% of the 
firms were solvent at the time of their bankruptcy filing with firms holding about 470% more 
debt than equity.  
 *Table 2-Descripitive Statistics Full Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Emerged 121 0.4628 0.0000 0.5007
Assets Before 121 14678.1100 1377.5300 69770.6300
Operating Profit Margin Before 108 -0.1958 0.0218 1.3601
Day In BK 121 570.8760 457.0000 460.8484
Solvency Before 118 0.7458 1.0000 0.4373
Involuntary BK 121 0.0744 0.0000 0.2635
CEO Days Before 121 1337.0200 298.0000 2185.5900
PrepackPreNeg 121 0.1818 0.0000 0.3873
Ceo Gender 121 0.9256 1.0000 0.2635
Ceo Replaced During BK 121 0.4545 0.0000 0.5000
DE_Ratio 118 4.7001 9.1607 70.8059
YearFiled 121 2000.9300 2002.0000 8.3484
Full Sample
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When the sample was split into pre-crisis and post-crisis samples, the characteristics of 
the sample varied greatly. Only 33% of firms emerged from bankruptcy after the 2008 financial 
crisis whereas 53% emerged from bankruptcy prior to the crisis. Firms also spent an average of 
597.82 days in bankruptcy pre-crisis as to only 520.19 days post-crisis. Of the post crisis sample, 
no firm was forced into bankruptcy by its creditors; however, in the pre-crisis sample about 11% 
of the firms went into bankruptcy involuntarily. The average tenure and gender of the CEO was 
similar in each sample. Only differing about 64 days and 3% respectively. About 26% more 
CEO’s were replaced during bankruptcy pre-crisis compared to post-crisis. The prevalence of 
prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies were similar with the average number only differing 
by 1%. Financially, the samples differed greatly in size with post-crisis firms holding $26.62 
billion more in assets. Both sets of firms operated at a loss prior to bankruptcy with pre-crisis 
firms averaging a $80,710 loss and post crisis firms averaging a $366,720 loss. Post-crisis firms 
tended to be more solvent with at 83% compared to pre-crisis firms only being solvent 70% of the 
time. Firms leverage varied greatly between samples with post-crisis firms holding 970% more 
debt than equity and pre-crisis firms only holding 126% more debt than equity. 
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*Table 3-Desciptive Statistics Pre-Crisis Sample 
 
*Table 4-Descriptive Statistics Post-Crisis Sample 
 
 
  
Variable N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Emerged 79 0.5316 1.0000 0.5022
Assets Before 79 5439.8200 979.4000 12172.9900
Operating Profit Margin Before 66 -0.0871 0.0572 1.4463
Day In BK 79 597.8228 457.0000 498.9107
Solvency Before 76 0.6974 1.0000 0.4624
Involuntary BK 79 0.1139 0.0000 0.3197
CEO Days Before 79 1314.8100 242.0000 2275.7600
PrepackPreNeg 79 0.4772 0.0000 0.3843
Ceo Gender 79 0.9367 1.0000 0.2450
Ceo Replaced During BK 79 0.5443 1.0000 0.5012
DE_Ratio 76 1.2647 3.3847 81.0190
YearFiled 79 1996.1400 1997.0000 6.2259
Pre Sample
Variable N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Emerged 42 0.3333 0.0000 0.4771
Assets Before 42 32054.8800 3294.0900 116154.9100
Operating Profit Margin Before 42 -0.3667 -0.1050 1.2095
Day In BK 42 520.1905 434.5000 379.5168
Solvency Before 42 0.8333 1.0000 0.3772
Involuntary BK 42 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CEO Days Before 42 1378.8100 638.0000 2031.0900
PrepackPreNeg 42 0.1905 0.0000 0.3974
Ceo Gender 42 0.9048 1.0000 0.2971
Ceo Replaced During BK 42 0.2857 0.0000 0.4572
DE_Ratio 42 10.9166 13.8057 47.3057
YearFiled 42 2009.9500 2009.5000 1.6223
Post Sample
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6.2 Results of the T-Test 
As one can see from the descriptive statistics in Table 3 and Table 4 the means of the 
variables differed in each sample. However, not all differences were statistically significant. 
Using an independent-sample difference-in-means t-test, variables with a p-value of less than .05 
are considered to be significantly different.  
There was a statistically significant difference in the number of firms that emerged from 
bankruptcy. This finding suggests there are factors or changes in factors present in the pre-crisis 
sample that make firms more likely to emerge from bankruptcy as compared to the post-crisis 
sample. 
There was also a statistically significant difference in the average number of total assets 
held by firms, the prevalence of involuntary bankruptcies, and the prevalence of CEO 
replacements during bankruptcy. 
As for the rest of the variables, the result from Table 5 suggests there is not enough 
evidence to prove that there is a true difference in the means of the two samples. 
 *Table 5-Results of the means T-Test 
 
Variable Pre Mean Post Mean Difference T-value P value 
Emerge 0.5132 0.3333 0.1983 2.1000 0.0375
AssetsBefore 5439.8000 32054.9000 -26615.1000 -2.0200 0.0453
Operating Profit Margin -0.0871 -0.3667 0.2797 1.0400 0.2997
DaysIn 597.8000 520.2000 77.6323 0.8800 0.3799
SolvencyBefore 0.6974 0.8333 -0.1360 -1.6300 0.1061
Involuntary 0.1139 0.0000 0.1139 2.3000 0.0229
CeodaysBefore 1314.8000 1378.8000 -63.9994 -0.1500 0.8789
PrepackagedPreNeg 0.1772 0.1905 -0.0133 -0.1800 0.8586
Ceo_Gender 0.9367 0.9048 0.0319 0.6300 0.5277
CeoReplacedDuringBK 0.5443 0.2857 0.2586 2.7800 0.0063
DE_Ratio 1.2647 10.9166 -9.6519 -0.7100 0.4807
YearFiled 1996.1000 2010.0000 -13.8131 -14.1000 0.0001
T-Tests
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6.3 Results of the Binary Logistic Regression  
Logistic regression is used to model bankruptcy emergence as well demonstrate the 
significance of specific variable contribution to bankruptcy emergence in a multivariate setting. 
As shown in Table 6, 7, and 8, I ran five different binary logistic regressions consisting of five 
models. I then proceeded to apply these models to the full sample, pre-crisis sample, and post-
crisis sample respectively. It is important to note for the interpretation of the results, that the 
outcome modeled through these procedures is failure to emerge from bankruptcy. Thus, the 
inverse of the direction of the coefficients is true for bankruptcy emergence. 
The contributory variables that consist of Model 1 are assets before bankruptcy, days in 
bankruptcy, CEO tenure before bankruptcy, CEO gender, CEO replacement during bankruptcy, 
and debt to equity ratio. In Model 2, there is the addition of the involuntary bankruptcy variable, 
and in Model 3, there is the addition of the involuntary bankruptcy and solvency variable. In 
Model 4, I use the same variables as Model 3; however, instead of using the assets before 
bankruptcy, I use the logarithm of the assets before bankruptcy. In my last model, I use the same 
variables that are present in Model 1 with the addition of operating profit margin variable. The 
models were run on the full sample of bankruptcies (Table 6), pre-crisis bankruptcies (Table 7), 
and post-crisis bankruptcies (Table 8).  
 Each of the five models for each of the three respective samples were significant in 
modeling bankruptcy emergence as demonstrated by the significance of the Chi-squared test 
statistic; however, most of the tested variables lacked any contributory significance.   
In the full sample, all fives models were significant in modeling bankruptcy emergence at 
the 95% confidence level, but the only two statistically significant variables were CEO 
replacement during bankruptcy and days in bankruptcy. These variables were significant across 
all five models with CEO replacement being positively associated with bankruptcy emergence 
and days in bankruptcy being negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence. Debt to Equity, 
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CEO Gender, and the presence of a prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcy were also 
positively related to bankruptcy emergence; however, their contribution to the outcome was not 
deemed statistically significant. It may also be a point of interest to note that debt to equity 
changes becomes negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence in Model 5. 
(See Table 6 at the end of the section) 
In the pre-crisis sample, CEO Replacement, being positively associated with bankruptcy 
emergence, was the only significant variable across all five models. Days in bankruptcy, which 
was negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence, was significant in every model except 
Model 5. This may be due to the decrease in sample size as Model 5 includes operating profit 
margin. If a firm did not have an observed operating profit margin calculation they were then 
excluded from the model. Subsequently the sample size dropped from 76 to 65.  
Some other changes occur in the association of variable to bankruptcy emergence. Debt 
to equity is now negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence across all five models. Assets 
before also changes its association in all five models, except Model 4, now being positively 
associated with bankruptcy emergence. 
(See Table 7 at the end of the section) 
In the post-crisis sample, all contributory variables, even CEO replacement, lack 
statistical significance. Assets before are now negatively associated with bankruptcy emergence 
across all five models whereas debt to equity becomes positively associated with emergence 
across all five models. CEO tenure which had been negatively associated with bankruptcy 
emergence across the previous two samples, now becomes positively associated with bankruptcy 
emergence in Models 1 and 2.  
(See Table 8 at the end of the section) 
The drop in the significance of variables in the post-crisis sample, suggests that firm-
specific variables are not relevant in predicting bankruptcy emergence in a post-financial crisis 
climate. Where we saw a few firm-specific variables indicative of emergence in the pre-crisis 
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sample, the findings from the post-crisis sample allude to systematic and macroeconomic 
determinants being the main predictors of bankruptcy emergence.  
This conclusion about bankruptcy emergence remains consistent when you think about 
the inverse, filing for bankruptcy. In a pre-crisis climate, bankruptcy is an individualized firm 
phenomenon. Mostly, when a firm files bankruptcy in a pre-crisis climate it is due to some 
characteristic of their own individual operation such as poor management or unbalanced firm 
structure. This differs from a post-crisis climate because bankruptcy becomes an industry wide 
phenomenon rather than a firm-specific event. Often in a post-financial crisis climate, firms are 
filing bankruptcy not due to any fault of their own, but because of the lack of available credit and 
lower consumer consumption in the overall market. The difference in the determinants of 
bankruptcy filings may be an explanation for the difference in bankruptcy emergence indicators; 
however, it must be further researched to come to any concrete conclusion.  
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7. Conclusions and Areas for Future Research 
In this study, I analyze the relationship between the 2008 financial crisis and bankruptcy 
emergence indicators. To perform this analysis, I identified several variables that could 
potentially impact a firm’s probability of bankruptcy emergence. In addition, I studied these 
relationships before and after the 2008 crisis in both a univariate and multivariate setting. 
The findings of this study suggest that the number of days a firm was in bankruptcy and 
whether the firm replaced their CEO during bankruptcy were key indicators of the probability of 
bankruptcy emergence. These variables were significant predictors in the full sample size as well 
as the pre-crisis sample. However, in the post-crisis sample no observed variable was statistically 
significant in predicting bankruptcy emergence. Another key finding from this study was that 
there was a statistically significant greater number of firms emerging from bankruptcy before the 
financial crisis as compared to after the financial crisis.  
I correctly hypothesized that the number of days spent in bankruptcy would be negatively 
correlated with bankruptcy emergence in the full sample; however, the rest of my findings were 
not statistically significant enough to prove my three formally stated hypotheses in their entirety. 
The basis for my third hypothesis, that there would be a statistically significant difference in the 
probability of bankruptcy emergence in the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples also remained 
accurate. However, contrary to the third hypothesis, this difference was not caused by the 
proposed variables: assets before bankruptcy, solvency before bankruptcy, operating profit 
margin before bankruptcy, and debt to equity before bankruptcy. 
One way to improve this study is to increase the sample size. The full sample size of 
bankrupt financial firms was large enough to obtain substantial results; however, when divided 
into two samples, the statistical power of the regression models and their results were greatly 
compromised. If taken further, it may be beneficial to widened the scope of this study to include 
more industries, rather than just limiting to the study to the financial sector. Opening the study to 
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more industries may yield drastically different results; however, it is important to note that not all 
variables can be controlled across multiple industries. 
A finding that may warrant future research is the significant difference in the level of 
emerging firms in the pre-crisis sample as compared to the post-crisis sample. This would suggest 
that there are significant changes in indicator variables across these two populations. These 
specific variables just may not have been tested. In this study, only firm specific variables were 
analyzed. This finding, accompanied by the decrease in significance of certain indicator variables 
in the post-crisis sample, may suggest that the variability in emergence indicators across these 
two populations comes from systematic variables rather than firm-specific variables. Ultimately, 
this may indicate macroeconomic factors play a more significant role in bankruptcy emergence 
than microeconomic and firm specific factors. 
Conclusively, this study demonstrates that bankruptcy emergence has a significant 
relationship with the number of days in bankruptcy as well as the replacement of the CEO during 
bankruptcy in a full sample of bankrupt firms and in a sample of firms who went bankrupt prior 
to the financial crisis. The significant difference in the number of firms that emerged from 
bankruptcy between the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples, as well as the lack of significant firm-
specific indicators of bankruptcy emergence in the post-crisis sample, opens areas of future in the 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and bankruptcy emergence. In addition, if the 
study was adjusted to include multiple industries there may be further results. 
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